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Controlling Jury Damage Awards in Private Antitrust Suits 
Legal commentators have long realized that juries often base de-
cisions on emotional or nonevidential factors. 1 Professor Kalven, 
dean of the jury behavior researchers, found that jury decisions 
spring from the "response of the jury's common sense equity when 
confronted with formal legal rules."2 While recognizing this phe-
nomenon, commentators vigorously disagree about its desirability. 
Many have praised this feature of the jury system because it tempers 
strict rules of law with notions of fairness and justice.3 Other com-
mentators have criticized jury flexibility for creating uncertainty for 
the litigating parties and for subverting clear legislative decisions.4 
Treble damage antitrust suits provide a unique context for this 
debate on jury equity. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that a 
private plaintiff who successfully brings an antitrust action shall re-
cover treble damages from the defendant.5 In a jury trial, the jury 
I. Clarence Darrow, speaking of criminal juries, took the extreme view that "U]urymen 
seldom convict a person they like, ·or acquit one that they dislike. The main work of a trial 
lawyer is to make a jury like his client or, at least, to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding the 
crime are relatively unimportant." E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 431 (9th ed. 
1974) (quoting Clarence Darrow). 
For empirical support that juries do sometimes base decisions on nonevidential factors, see 
H. KALVEN & H. ZElSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 104-17 (1964); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSY-
CHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 146, 153-54 (2d ed. 1980): Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullffecation, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 51, 69-71 (1980). 
The textual discussion should not be confused with the debate on jury nullification. Jury 
nullification refers to the power of the jury in criminal cases to disregard the law and acquit 
the defendant. Commentators have debated whether criminal juries should be instructed that 
they have this power. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra, at 52-55. 
2. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury .Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 
158, 164 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Personal Injury .Damage Award]. 
Kalven does not argue that juries ignore the law whenever it suits them. To the contrary, 
he argues that judge and jury decisions in most cases are identical. See Kalven, The .Dignity of 
the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1064-65 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Civil Jury]. He be-
lieves that juries, on average, will tend to follow their equitable propensities more thanjudges, 
see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 320-21, but these propensities only enter into 
jury decisions when the case is close on the evidence. Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra, at 
172. 
3. See, e.g., C. JOINER, CIVIL Jusnc~ AND THE JURY 35-38 (1962); Scheflin & Van Dyke, 
supra note 1, at 69-72; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1286 (1950). 
4. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 127-35 (1949); Green, Juries and Justice, 1962 u. 
ILL. L.F. 152. 
5. The statute provides in pertinent part 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States 
• • • and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). This statute supersedes Section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 
(1890), which only provided treble damages for Sherman Act violations. This provision 
awards treble damages for violations of any of the "antitrust laws." 
In 1980, Congress amended this provision. Congress gave the trial judge discretion to 
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determines the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of 
the violations, 6 and the court trebles that amount.7 Any jury manip-
ulation of the damage award - that is, any damage determination 
based on nonevidential factors - is tripled in magnitude by this 
provision. 
This Note takes the position that the courts should better control 
jury manipulation in private antitrust actions. Part One suggests 
that manipulation is likely in such actions, and argues that this ma-
nipulation off ends the legislative judgment reflected in the trebling 
provision without leading to more equitable results. Part Two 
presents two complementary proposals to control jury manipulation 
of treble damage awards. These proposals aim to induce the jury to 
return accurate awards based on the econ6mic loss actually suffered 
by the plaintiff. 
I. JURY MANIPULATION IN ANTITRUST CASES 
This Part examines the likelihood and consequences of jury 
deviation from actual losses in awarding antitrust damages. An ini-
tial examination suggests that juries aware of the trebling rule will 
reduce damages to compensate for a perceived windfall, while juries 
unaware of the trebling rule may respond to perceptions of equity by 
awarding damages in excess of the plaintiffs actual losses. Either 
possibility offends the legislative judgment fixing the recovery for 
antitrust violations at three times the losses sustained by the plaintiff. 
This analysis makes out a compelling case for better guiding the 
jury's determination of damages in civil antitrust actions. 
A. The Likelihood of Jury Manipulation 
Since a principle justification for the use of juries is their ability 
to temper the strict language of the law, one would expect some 
deviation between the level of damages dictated by the law and the 
award the plaintiff interest on actual damages running from the date the suit is filed. Antitrust 
Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, sec. 4(a)(l), § 4, 94 Stat. 11S6 
(1980) (to be codified at IS U.S.C. § 15). 
6. The statute refers to "damages by him [the plaintift] sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), 
For the plaintiff to recover, he must prove some injury. Once there is proof of injury, courts 
relax the burden of proof on the amount of economic loss. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v, Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 39S U.S. 100, 123-2S (1969); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
§§ 343, 34S (1978). Methods of proving damages are varied and complex. See, e.g., Lanzil-
lotti, Problems of Proof of J)amages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329 (1971) (detail-
ing statistical problems of the different theories of recovery). 
1. E.g., Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, S33 F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (1977). As this Note 
went to press, the Seventh Circuit decided MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos, 80-2171, 80-2288 
(7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The court upheld 
some of the jury's findings of liability, but remanded the case for a retrial on damages o~y, 
consistent with other appellate findings regarding liability.· As the jury award, when trebled, 
amounted to nearly two billion dollars, the decision illustrates very well the potential dimen-
sions of the issue. 
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amount actually awarded by the jury. This common sense conclu-
sion is supported by the observations of attorneys in antitrust cases8 
and other contexts.9 Judges, too, have recognized the possibility of 
jury manipulation. 10 
While little direct evidence confirms these apprehensions of jury 
manipulation in antitrust cases, 11 some research does indicate that 
significant manipulation of damages occurs in civil jury trials. In a 
study of some 4,000 trials, 12 Kalven and Zeisel found that in cases 
where both the judge and jury agreed that the plaintiff should re-
cover, 13 there was "considerable disagreement on the level of dam-
ages." 14 In these cases, the jury awarded plaintiffs twenty percent 
8. See, e.g., Blecher, The Plaint!lfs Viewpoint, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 76, 76-77 (1968-1969) 
(jury decisions are "motivated by emotional factors," just as in any other kind of case). 
9. See, e.g., E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note I, at 431 (quoting Clarence 
Darrow). 
10. Concern over this possibility frequently leads judges to instruct the jury not to treat 
corporate defendants differently from other defendants or to restrict their award to compensa-
tory damages. See notes 29 & 72 iefra. Judges deciding whether juries should be informed 
that their antitrust awards will be trebled have also expressed concern about the possibility of 
jury manipulation. See note 21 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659,667 (5th Cir. 1974) (no empirical data on 
the effect of informing the jury of trebling coupled with a cautionary instruction). The re-
search conducted for this Note did not disclose any empirical study of the impact of a treble 
damage instruction on jury behavior in antitrust cases. The best available evidence thus ap-
pears to be reports of interviews with jurors in antitrust cases conducted after trial; though at 
best fragmentary, these interviews support the notion that juries would reduce awards if in-
formed of trebling. See note 23 iefra. 
12. The results of this study are discussed in Civil Jury, supra note 2. This study was part 
of the University of Chicago Jury Project, a massive empirical and experimental study of jury 
behavior. Kalven and Zeisel published a volume on the study of criminal juries. See H. 
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note I. Unfortunately, the promised companion volume on civil 
jury behavior was never published. The data on civil juries are scattered among numerous 
books and law review articles. 
To assess the behavior of juries, the Jury Project researchers decided to determine the level 
of disagreement between juries and the judges presiding over the jury trial. To determine how 
the judge would have decided the case, judges presiding over jury trials were given question-
naires at the end of each trial. If the judge disagreed with the jury verdict, the judge was asked 
to explain the reasons for the disagreement. Id. at 45-46. The accuracy of this method of 
determining the reason for disagreement is, therefore, dependent on the judges' ability to infer 
the reasons for the juries' decisions. 
In addition to this empirical work, the Project interviewed jurors after trials, ran public 
opinion polls and "tried" cases before mock juries. For a further description of the various 
techniques, see Breeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959). 
The researchers realized these methods were not perfect, but still felt they were able to 
approximate actual jury behavior patterns. See H. Kalven & H. Zeise!, supra note l, at 3-54; 
Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra note 2, at 159 n.4, 172 n.38. Other researchers have 
been far more vehement in their criticisms. See M. BALDWIN & M. McC0NVILLE, JURY TRI-
ALS 6-8 (1979). Still others have strongly criticized Baldwin and McConnville for their re-
search methodology. See Hastie, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 728, 728-33 (1981). 
13. Kalven reported that the presiding judges agreed with the jury's decision on liability 
79% of the time. Civil Jury, supra note 2, at 1065. 
14. Id. at 1065. 
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more on average than the judge would have awarded.15 The major 
reason for this disagreement was that juries incorporated their no-
tions of "common sense equ.ity"16 into the legal standard of 
compensation.17 
In antitrust cases, the jury's awareness of the treble damage pro-
vision probably will affect significantly its notion of equity. The ma-
jority of courts have refused to inform juries of the trebling provision 
or have held that it is error to do so. 18 These courts assume that 
juries are typically unaware that the damage award will be trebled.19 
Judges fear that if juries are informed of the trebling provision they 
will consider it a windfall to the plaintiff and will lower the award to 
15. Id Though this is true on average, the judge would have awarded more than the jury 
in thirty-nine percent of the cases. 
16. Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra note 2, at 164. See Civil Jury, supra note 2, at 
1065-66; H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 495. Other researchers have suggested that 
factors other than equitable considerations may have an important bearing on jury decisions. 
For example, studies have found that a defendant's unpleasant personality traits, see, e.g., 
Izzet & Sales, Person Perception and Juror's Reactions to .Defendants, in 2 PERSPECTIVES IN 
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 209, 216-17 (1981), and even physical attractiveness, can affect the 
decisions of mock juries. See, e.g.' M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 
154-60 (1978). 
17. In explaining jury behavior, Kalven and others emphasize that they are talking about 
"tendencies," not absolute laws of jury decision-making. See, e.g., Personal Injury .Damage 
Award, supra note 2, at 172-73. This circumspection is prompted by both the great variations 
injury behavior,see id., and by the inherent limitations in the research methodology. See note 
12supra. 
18. Since 1974, seven appellate courts and a district court have all decided against inform-
ing the jury of trebling. See Heattransfer Corp. v. Volkswagen-werk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 989 
n.21 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978); Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 
F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 904 (1977); Sulmeyer v. 
Coca Cola Co. (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph 
Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975); Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, 
Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 
· 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Pollock & RileY. Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 
1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); Overhead Door Corp. v. Nordpal Corp., (1979-1) Trade Cas. ~ 
62,594 (D. Minn. 1978). See also Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873,889 n.15 (8th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980) (noting, in dicta, that it would be a "better practice" 
not to inform the jury of the trebling provision). Of all these cases, only Noble had a dissenter. 
See generally 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 90.39 (3d ed. 1977) (the authors no longer recommend informing the jury of trebling because 
of the danger of reversal). 
Until this recent line of cases, most cases favored informing the jury of trebling. See, e.g., 
cases cited in E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 19.06, at 
282 n.18 (1965). But see Sabloskey v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929, 942 
(E.D. Pa. 1955); Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4, 11 (D.D.C. 
1955), revd on other grounds, 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). 
Despite the position taken in recent cases, some courts are still apparently giving an in-
struction on trebling. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS 188 (1980). 
19. This assumption is implicit in the holdings. In the leading case, Pollock & Riley Inc. v. 
Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974), the court stated that the "probable conse-
quence" of an instruction on trebling would be lower awards. 498 F.2d at 1243. This would 
only be a "probable consequence" if the jury did not already know of trebling, and so was 
confronted with the trebling provision for the first time in the instructio~. 
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offset this windfall.20 Although there is no empirical data on the 
question, courts and commentators uniformly agree that juries with 
this knowledge are likely to reduce awards.2 I This conclusion finds 
some support in Kalven's research, which indicated that juries do 
decrease damage verdicts if they feel that the plaintiffs are receiving 
windfalls.22 Interviews with antitrust juries confirm this hypothesis 
with persuasive, if scientifically informal, evidence of jury sensitivity 
to the trebling provision. 23 
Despite the judiciary's attempt to prevent this type of manipula-
tion by withholding information about trebling, some juries un-
doubtedly know that damages will be trebled. Juries may recall the 
publicity surrounding cases like MCI Communications Corp. v. ATT, 
where the plaintiff won a verdict at trial of $1.8 billion, 24 or learn of 
trebling during the course of the trial.25 
20. See, e.g., Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1975); 
Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974). 
21. See, e.g., cases cited in note 20supra; Note,Antitrust Law-Jury Instructions on Treble 
Damages Held Erroneous, 26 MERCER L. Rev. 1003, 1007 (1975). Even those courts and com-
mentators that advocate informing the jury of trebling generally do not dispute that the jury's 
knowledge of trebling will result in lower verdicts. Instead, they argue that the jury already 
has this knowledge and hence the likely effect of an instruction will be to prevent misunder-
standing. See, e.g., E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 18, §19.06. 
22. Personal Injury Damage Award, supra note 2, at 169. 
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 19, 1980, § D, at 5, col. I (In the jury trial involving MCI 
Communications and American Telegraph & Telephone, some of the jurors did not know of 
the trebling provision before they returned a 600 million dollar verdict. When the jury fore-
man learned of trebling after the trial, he said, "I'd feel much better about the whole thing if 
they reduced the damages."); Cummings, Anti-trust Administration and Enforcement and the 
Attorney General's Committee Report, A General Survey and Critique, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 307, 
308 (1955) ("A recent poll ofa Philadelphia jury revealed their dismay when they learned that 
their already generous antitrust verdict would automatically be trebled."). 
24. MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available 
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The jury awarded the plaintiff $600 million and this 
amount was then trebled by the court. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, § 19.06, at 281 
(suggesting that juries "may also learn of trebling from newspapers"). 
25. See, e.g., Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 616, 678 (2d Cir. 
1953). These considerations led the Committee on Trade Regulation and Trade-Marks of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York to conclude that "U)uries can hardly fail to 
learn that damages will be trebled under the statute." Committee on Trade Regulation and 
Trade-Marks of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on H.R. 3408, 
reprinted in Discretionary Treble Damages in Private Antitrust Suits: Hearings on H.R. 4597 
.Before Subcomm No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) . 
.But see note 59 infra and accompanying text 
Without empirical evidence, it is very difficult to estimate how frequently juries are aware 
of trebling. It is noteworthy, however, that every recent case addressing the issue has implicitly 
assumed that juries tend not to be aware of trebling (see cases cited in note 18 supra). Absent 
such an assumption, it would make little sense not to provide an instruction on trebling so that 
the jury does not misunderstand its role. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 18, § 19.06, at 281-82 
("Unless the trebling provision is clearly explained to the jury, basic misunderstandings may 
arise which would result in totally erroneous verdicts and judgments. For example, the jury 
might itself treble the amount of damages with the effect that plaintiff would recover nine 
times the amount of actual damages. Or the jury might divide the amount of damages by 
three."). 
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Conversely, if a jury does not know of the trebling provision, it is 
likely to conform with the general tendency of juries to manipulate 
awards upward.26 This phenomenon seems particularly likely in an-
titrust cases since defendants are often large corporations. Empirical 
data indicate that juries have a strong bias against corporate defend-
ants, 27 a bias appreciated by attomeys28 and by judges.29 
Because it is not clear how often juries are aware of trebling, and 
because this awareness is likely to determine the direction of jury 
manipulation of awards, it is impossible to determine whether the 
aggregate effect of such manipulation in antitrust cases is to decrease 
or increase awards. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that in 
every antitrust case, a strong possibility exists that the jury's sense of 
equity will have a significant impact on its determination of 
damages. 
B. The Consequences of Jury Manipulation 
How should the courts respond to the probability that juries rely 
on extra-legal factors in determining antitrust damage awards? 
Many commentators have defended jury manipulation on the 
ground that juries should occasionally ignore harsh legal standards 
26. Not surprisingly, losing attorneys in antitrust cases have complained about excessive 
jury verdicts. One lawyer for American Telephone & Telegraph called the jury's decision to 
award MCI Communications 600 million dollars "obscene." Rowley & Knott, $1.8 Billio11 
Antitrust Verdict Against AT&T, Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1980, § I, at I. Another attorney 
was puzzled by the verdict. He noted that MCI Communications had only claimed 450 mil-
lion dollars in lost revenue, though the prayer for relief asked for $900 million. N.Y. Times, 
June 14, 1980, § I, at I. 
27. Broeder found juries biased against corporations on both liability and damage issues. 
Juries found corporate defendants liable two percent more often than did judges. On dam• 
ages, the jury awarded 25% more against corporate defendants than the judge would have 
awarded. Broeder, supra note 12, at 750-51. 
One explanation for this may be that juries "adjust their awards according to the defen-
dants ability to pay." Id. at 751. Corporations, like state or city governments, are "deep 
pockets" - juries believe the defendants are not really hurt by a large award to the plaintiff. 
Broeder points out that judges and juries are much closer on damages when the defendant is 
an individual. Id. at 750. See also Personal Injury Pamage Award, supra note 2, at 171 (effect 
of insurance on the size of awards). Another possible explanation could be general bias against 
corporations. Harold Levy, former general counsel of American Telephone & Telegraph, as-
serts that juries tend to show an "affinity for the little guy" ·in big business cases. See Sylvester, 
Jury's Still Out on Jury Trials, Natl. L.J., March 1, 1982, at 1, col. I. 
28. At the July, 1981 convention of the American Trial Lawyers Association, delegates 
were coached to "seethe with rage at a corporate defendant's villainy." N.Y. Times, July 28, 
1981, § D, at 20, col. I. 
29. Judges believe this bias is so pervasive that a special cautionary instruction is required. 
Devitt & Blackmar, in their set of recommended jury instructions, include a standard instruc-
tion for use in all federal civil trials with a corporate defendant. The instruction cautions the 
jury that "[a] corporation is entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as a private individ-
ual." 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR supra note 18, § 71.05. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
ABA, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 138-40 (1972); R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF IN· 
STRUCTING THE JURY § 4.37 (1968). 
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and reach verdicts based on community norms of justice.30 But 
whatever the validity of this argument in other situations, it has little 
merit in the context of private treble damage actions. The private 
cause of action for antitrust violations exists solely by force of legis-
lation, and jury manipulation in such cases offends both the statu-
tory provision creating the cause of action and the policies behind it. 
1. Statutory Analysis 
"[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of 
the statute itself."31 Section 4 of the Clayton Act entitles the success-
ful private plaintiff to recover "threefold the damages by him sus-
tained."32 This language suggests that the financial value of the 
plaintiff's actual losses is the amount to be trebled; the statute refers 
to the damages "sustained" by the plaintiff rathe! than those per-
ceived by the jury. Admittedly, antitrust damages frequently defy 
precise calculation, and juries often can assess damages only approx-
imately. 33 The jury's value in estimating uncertain damages, how-
ever, goes only to the determination of damages actually 
"sustained," and not to any normative adjustment of those damages 
according to the jury's sense of equity. 
The purposes of the trebling provision support such an interpre-
tation. The private damage action serves both as a remedy and as a 
deterrent, compensating the victim and protecting the public by pun-
ishing the offender.34 These objectives frequently conflict, for dam-
ages in excess of actual losses impose on the defendant a penalty 
deliberately disproportionate to the harm caused by his wrongdoing, 
which accrues to the plaintiff as a windfall. 35 The trebling provision, 
however mechanically, resolves this conflict between fairness and 
30. See note 3 supra. 
31. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
32. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 5 supra. 
33. See, e.g., Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (the "damage issues in 
these cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is 
available in other contexts."); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) 
("the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and 
render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances, 'juries are allowed to act upon probable 
and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof.'") (citations omitted); Story Parchment 
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 377-79 (1927). 
34. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308,314 (1978) (''The Court has noted that§ 4 has two 
purposes: to deter violators and deprive them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and 'to compen-
sate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.'") (citations omitted); Fortner Enterprises 
v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) ("As the special provision awarding treble 
damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation 
not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the im-
portant public interest in free competition."). 
35. Since punishment cannot deter unless the penalties imposed for violations exceed their 
rewards, conflict between deterrence and compensation is inevitable. Deterrent punishment 
makes "a defendant suffer not for what he only has done but because of other people's tenden-
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utility by fixing damages at a multiple of the plaintiffs losses.36 Since 
Congress has already weighed the wrongfulness of the defendant's 
conduct and the need for deterrence against the principle of compen-
satory justice, the statute leaves no room for further equitable tinker-
ing according to the conscience of the jury.37 The jury's function in a 
civil antitrust case, then, is to determine as a factual matter the 
amount of plaintiffs losses; the statutory trebling provision then de-
termines, as a normative matter, the amount of plaintiffs judgment. 
cies." United States v. Alton Box Board Co., (1977) Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,336, at 71,166 
(N.D. Ill.). 
This tension surfaces repeatedly in Supreme Court decisions; the Court often appears to 
emphasize one statutory purpose over another depending on the result to be reached. Com-
pare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) ("Section 4, in 
contrast, is in essence a remedial provision .... Of course, treble damages also play an impor-
tant role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently ob-
served."), with Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) 
("The plaintiff who reaps the rewards of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible 
than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in 
favor of competition."). 
36. As Judge Wood noted at the outset of his MCI opinion: 
If there is any inclination, however, to generally find fault with the impressive verdict, I 
would shift a good share of the blame on to the law itself. There is necessarily permitted 
in antitrust cases some laxity in the computation of damages, as we shall discuss. A just 
and reasonable "estimate," based upon relevant data, will suffice although it must be short 
of speculation or guess work. After a jury, with that practical computation leeway, has 
conscientiously rendered a verdict which presumably the jury believes will fully compen-
sate the plaintiff for its damages, the statute then takes over [and] multiplies that verdict 
by three. . . . In my judgment the trebling requirement deserves Congressional re-
view. . . . But, in any event, we have to try to resolve this case as we now find the law 
and the evidence. 
MCI Commn. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Newer file) (separate opinion of Wood, J.) at n.1. 
Congress could have decided that a multiplier lower or higher than three would provide 
the proper balance between these competing policies. Although the legislative history behind 
the treble damage provision is scant, it is clear that there was at least some consideration of 
single or double damages. Bernard, On Judgments and Settlements in Antitrust Litigations: 
When Should.Damages he Trebles?, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 1 n.l (1981). Moreover, Congress 
has on a number of occasions rejected, or refused to act on, proposals to modify either the 
multiplier or to make the treble damage award discretionary. See note 48 supra. 
Justices of the Supreme Court have noted the extraordinary nature of this remedy,see, e.g., 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442-43 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (contrasting the "massive" liability under trebling with financial penalties imposed by 
other Federal laws); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 
while also observing that Congress has refused to adjust this resolution of the competing con-
cerns. See 435 U.S. at 443 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 599 n.39 (per Stevens, 
J.). Similarly, commentators have noted the special attributes of a recovery set above the level 
of actual damages. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & w. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY 
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 84-96 (1976); Note, Antitrust Treble .Damages as Applied to Local 
Govemment Entities: .Does the Punishment Fit the .Defendant?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 414. 
37. See Note,sup,:a note 21, at 1007. See also Parker, Treble .Damage Action-A Financial 
.Deterrent lo Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483, 501 (1971); Study of Monopoly 
Power: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1949) (testimony of Walton Hamilton). Courts have con-
sistently recognized that the function of juries in antitrust cases is to determine the amount of 
damages and not the sum that the plaintiff will actually receive. See, e.g., Pollock & Riley, 
Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); Semke v. Enid Automobile 
Dealers Assoc., 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972). 
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The anomalies that would result from permitting jury manipula-
tion support the conclusion that the statutory trebling provision 
preempts the jury's normative functions in determining antitrust 
damages. As indicated earlier, a key factor affecting the jury's sense 
of equity in antitrust cases is whether the jury knows that the court 
will treble its damage award. The presence or absence of such 
knowledge is, however, largely fortuitous from the standpoint of the 
opposing parties;38 it certainly bears no relevance to the merits or 
equities of a particular case. Allowing juries to manipulate awards 
when juries do not uniformly know of trebling39 would, therefore, 
lead to extremely inequitable results.40 
A second type of anomaly occurs in cases in which the jury is 
unaware of trebling. The notion that jury manipulation will result in 
a more just award depends on the assumption that the damages 
awarded by the jury will be the amount actually awarded; this is the 
amount that the jury has deemed an equitable result. Trebling this 
amount, however, abandons the jury's estimation of an equitable re-
sult - in fact, the jury would consider the amount awarded ex-
tremely inequitable. Moreover, in those cases where juries are 
unaware of trebling, there is no possibility that the jury will avoid 
this result by offsetting the trebling provision. Trebling by its very 
nature thus supersedes the traditional approval of adjusting damages 
according to the jury's sense of equity. 
These incongruities between the achievement of the jury's no-
tions of equity and the treble damage provision suggest that private 
antitrust suits are intended to further more important goals than jury 
equity. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the 
subordinate value of achieving an equitable result in Perma L!fe 
38. Since juries are typically not informed about trebling during the trial, their awareness 
of this fact will usually depend on their knowledge prior to the trial. The litigators may, how-
ever, be able to exercise some control over whether the jury is aware of trebling through jury 
selection or trial conduct. See Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 676, 
678 (2d Cir. 1953). 
39. One should not necessarily conclude from this discussion that courts should begin to 
inform juries of trebling. Even if one is willing to assume, as few courts have, that most juries 
are already aware of trebling, it seems likely that at least a significant number do not have this 
knowledge. To the extent that these juries lower verdicts as a result of trebling, the deterrent 
effect of private antitrust actions is diminished. See Note,supra note 21, at 1007 ("if informing 
the jury of the treble-damages provision of the Clayton Act could even potentially result in a 
reduced verdict, then the statutory purpose would be hampered and the instruction should not 
be allowed."). 
40. An illustration should make this inequity clear. Consider an antitrust case with Jury A, 
where Jury A is aware of the trebling provision. If Jury A decided for the plaintiff, its aware-
ness of the provision is likely to lead it to award less than actual damages. See notes 21-22 
supra and accompanying text. However, if a case with identical facts is tried before Jury B, 
which is unaware of trebling, Jury B is likely to award significantly more than actual damages. 
See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. Hence, although the facts of the cases, and 
consequently the relative equities of the cases, are exactly the same, jury manipulation has led 
to dramatically different results. 
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MujJlers v. International Parts Corporation. 41 In arguing that in pari 
delicto should not be a defense in private antitrust suits, four justices, 
in a plurality opinion, stated: 
The plaintiff who reaps the rewards of treble damages may be no less 
morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his 
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A 
more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties 
would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the pri-
vate action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement.42 
Of course, it does not matter whether a particular result is higher or 
lower than that contemplated by the trebling provision; the point is 
that in antitrust cases, the statute itself fulfills the functions typically 
discharged by the jury in setting the damages in other types of civil 
cases.43 
Thus, as a matter of legal method, quite independent of policy 
concerns, it follows that jury manipulation contravenes the statutory 
basis of the plaintiffs cause of action. Whether the jury distorts the 
damage award in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, manipula-
tion of damages frustrates the congressional intention animating the 
treble damages provision. Consequently, the courts should do all 
they can to maximize the jury's fidelity to the statutory damage 
formula. 
2. Policy Analysis 
Jury manipulation not only offends the statutory treble damages 
provision; it also threatens important policies served by the antitrust 
laws. Too low an award, arrived at in anticipation of statutory treb-
ling, undercuts the deterrent effect of private actions. On the other 
hand, too high an award stemming from antipathy to the corporate 
defendant has the opposite effect: potential but innocent defendants 
may forego legitimate and productive economic behavior, and po-
41. ~92 U.S. 134 (1968). 
42. 392 U.S. at 139. These four justices clearly believed that equity is a subordinate goal in 
private antitrust actions. Justice White's concurrence argued that in pari de/icto should be a 
defense in some circumstances, but he took this position because of the deterrence policy un-
derlying antitrust actions and not because of equitable considerations. 392 U.S. at 145-46 
(White, J., concurring). Justice Fortas also argued that in pari de/icto could be a defense, 
Whether he based this on deterrent grounds or on equitable considerations is not clear from 
his opinion. 392 U.S. at 147-48 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's concurrence argued 
that deterrence and equitable considerations dictate allowing in pari de/icto as a defense, but he 
recognized that in some circumstances the public policies advanced by the antitrust laws may 
override equitable considerations. 392 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, 
in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, indicated that equitable considerations justify recogni-
tion of in pari de/icto as a defense. 392 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The case suggests that at least five of the justices believed that the deterrent policy 
advanced by private antitrust actions is significantly more important than the achievement of 
an equitable result. See generally Note, Plaintiff's Misconduct as a Defense in Private Antitrust 
Actions, ll MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 382 (1981). 
43. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
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tential plaintiffs with colorable but meritless claims may bring nui-
sance suits, lured by the prospect of extorting a settlement from a 
defendant fearful of going to the jury. 
Jury manipulation may undercut the policies advanced by the 
treble damages provision. The provision is intended to facilitate en-
forcement of the antitrust laws in two ways. First, by increasing 
plaintiffs' recoveries, trebling encourages antitrust suits and thus en-
lists private plaintiffs in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.44 This 
financial incentive to bring suit is especially important given the dif-
ficulty and expense of litigating private antitrust suits. 45 Second, by 
imposing a harsh penalty for violations of the antitrust laws, trebling 
deters such transgressions.46 Congress has twice passed legislation to 
ensure the forceful implementation of these policies47 and has con-
sistently rejected proposals to weaken the trebling provision.48 Jury 
manipulation resulting in a smaller award frustrates these policies, 
because lower awards diminish both the incentive to bring suit and 
the ·penalty on the wrongdoer. 
Correspondingly, jury manipulation resulting in larger awards, 
due to juries' antipathy toward large corporations, aggravates certain 
negative policy consequences of the treble damages provision. Be-
cause of large potential recoveries, trebling creates an incentive to 
bring harassment suits.49 The possibility of such suits, and the dan-
gers incurred when business conduct falls within the gray areas of 
44. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); 
United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954). 
45. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) 
(quoting Sen. Sherman, sponsor of the Sherman Act, on the difficulty of maintaining antitrust 
suits). 
46. E.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977). . 
47. In 1980, Congress granted trial judges the discretion to award plaintiffs interest on their 
actual damages in addition. See note 5 supra. Though the primary purpose of this amend-
ment was to punish delaying tactics rather than to compensate plaintiffs, see 126 CONG. REc. 
H8047-48 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Mazzoli), this amendment does indicate 
congressional support for vigorous, undelayed use of the treble damage provision. 
Additionally, the compensatory portion of the plaintiff's recovery is exempted from taxes in 
some circumstances. The plaintiff will pay no taxes on the compensatory portion when he 
received no tax benefit on the loss caused by the antitrust violation. I.R.C. § 186. 
The Supreme Court has also accorded generous treatment to private plaintiffs because of 
these policy goals. The Court allows plaintiffs to recover even where the proof of the amount 
of damages is not concrete or detailed. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100 (1969), the Court stated that the lower courts must observe "the practical limits of the 
burden of proof which may be demanded of the antitrust plaintiff. . . damage issues in these 
cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available 
in other contexts." 395 U.S. at 123. The Court requires, however, that the plaintiff show he 
suffered some injury before these liberal rules as to the amount of injury apply. See note 6 
supra. 
48. Efforts to have the treble damage award reduced or eliminated were unsuccessful in 
1898 and 1908. Attempts to give courts discretion to reduce the damage award below the 
trebled amount were unsuccessful in 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961. K. ELZINGA & W. 
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 64-65 (1976). 
49. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 6, at § 331; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust £'!force-
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antitrust law,50 may deter some socially valuable competitive activ-
ity. 51 This risk of "overdeterrence" is exacerbated when jury manip-
ulation increases the potential liability of defendants.52 Finally, 
courts sometimes hesitate to expand the law to encompass new an-
ticompetitive practices.53 Fear of the enormous verdicts that may 
result from jury manipulation may further entrench this cautious 
attitude. 
In short, jury manipulation of antitrust awards furthers neither 
the purposes advanced by defenders of jury discretion nor the pur-
poses of the antitrust laws. To the contrary, such manipulation is 
very likely to lead to results that are both inequitable and, in terms 
of antitrust policy, unwise.54 
II. CONTROLLING JURY MANIPULATION 
This Part reviews current precautions against jury manipulation, 
and then presents two proposals designed more effectively to mini-
mize manipulation in private antitrust suits. These proposals attempt 
to reduce the incidence of manipulation by changing the way the 
jury undertakes its function and by rendering jury manipulation 
more susceptible to appellate review. Given the obstacles to more 
ambitious reforms, these proposals off er the most realistic means of 
controlling jury manipulation. 
men/ and Economic Efficiency, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 329, 340-44 (1974) (authors note that "nuisance 
suit" incentives are compounded by the unpredictability of jury verdicts). 
50. See Comment,Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of l)evelopments in t/1e 
Treble l)amage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061 n.334 (1962). 
51. See Elzinga in Panel l)iscussion: Private Actions - The Purposes Sought and t/1e Re-
sults Achieved, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 99 (1973) (arguing that antitrust suits based on preda-
tory behavior may result in "a lessening of price competition, additional price rigidity, and a 
greater propensity for companies to use non-price avenues of competition, such as advertising 
and frivolous product differentiation."). 
52. Even if jury manipulation does not increase the average recovery in private antitrust 
actions (because upward and downward manipulation of awards may offset each other), it 
should increase the likelihood of extremely large verdicts. By either increasing or decreasing 
awards, manipulation pushes verdicts away from the norm and toward extreme results. In 
considering whether to undertake activity that may lead to an antitrust suit, it is possible that 
corporations are more deterred by the low risk of an extremely large verdict than the more 
likely risk of a moderate verdict. See Breit & Elzinga,Antitrust Penalties and Altitudes Toward 
Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 705-06 (1973) (arguing that modern busi• 
nesses tend to be risk avoiders, and "that a risk adverse management is more likely to be 
deterred by high financial penalties than by a high probability of detection and conviction with 
accompanying penalties not severe."). 
53. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 6, at§ 331. 
54. Achieving a proper balance in antitrust cases between the competing policies "is clearly 
a difficult if not impossible task." Parker, The l)eterrent Effect of Private Treble l)amage Suits: 
Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286, 292 (1973). Congress is in a far superior position to 
investigate and balance these competing policies than is a jury that has neither expertise nor 
investigative capacity. 
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A. Current Efforts To Minimize Jury Manipulation 
The courts currently rely on two procedures to avoid jury manip-
ulation of antitrust damage awards. First, recent authority uni-
formly disfavors informing the jury of the trebling rule. Second, 
trial judges typically admonish the jury with general instructions on 
the nature of damages and the need to treat corporate defendants 
fairly. While fully justified, neither procedure offers an adequate re-
sponse to the manipulation problem. 
Although some division of authority exists,55 current authority 
unanimously rejects informing the jury of the trebling provision.56 
The reason for this approach is the apprehension that juries aware of 
the trebling rule will reduce damages accordingly, frustrating the de-
terrent purposes of the statute.57 The older, contrary authority rea-
soned from the premise that the jury would learn of the trebling 
provision in the course of the trial, requiring an instruction on treb-
ling to avoid confusion.58 The more recent opinions have the better 
argument, for three reasons. First, given a proper pretrial motion by 
plaintiff's counsel and appropriate rules of court, the trial can pro-
ceed without betraying the treble damage requirement.59 Second, 
the court can adopt a cautionary instruction to clarify the jury's role 
in assessing damages without discussing trebling.6° Finally, given 
the overriding importance accorded the deterrent function of the 
treble damages provision, the risk of the jury reducing damages out-
weighs the risks associated with jury uncertainty.61 Since informing 
the jury of the trebling provision does not advance any independent 
55. See note 18 supra for a summary of the conflicting authorities. 
56. Since 1974, seven appellate decisions have approved not informing the jury of trebling; 
only one judge dissented from this result. See note 18 supra. 
57. This assumption is implicit in the holdings. See note 19 supra. 
58. See Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 676, 678-79 (2d Cir. 
1953) ("Such a statement is more desirable than a half-recital, with attempted concealment of 
a part - a method leading inevitably to an overemphasis of an otherwise not significant 
detail."). 
59. There appears to be no inherent barrier to conducting the trial so as to avoid references 
to treble damages; the trial court can grant a plaintiffs motion in limine to forbid discussion of 
the trebling provision, and references in the pleadings to trebling can be excised if the court 
rules call for reading the pleadings to the jury. See generally Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 362 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (W.D. Tex. 1973), qffd., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(rules of this district court permit conduct of trial without disclosing pleadings or statutory 
damage provision to jury). The motion in limine should be made before voir dire to avoid any 
prejudicial questions during jury selection. See 498 F.2d at 1242. 
60. "Our immediate reaction [to the confusion argument] is that a district court can suffi-
ciently instruct the jury to determine only actual damages. In those cases where an accidental 
revelation occurs, the court can give curative instruction to alleviate confusion." Pollock & 
Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974). 
61. See Semke v. Enic Automobile Dealers Assn., 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972) 
("The consequences of advising the jury of this can only be that the jury will adjust its award 
accordingly .... therefore, it serves no useful function to communicate this information to 
the jury and it is potentially harmful, and hence [instructing the jury on trebling] was error."). 
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policy, trial courts should rely on the more recent authority and at-
tempt to prevent the jury from learning, from the trial or from in-
structions, that the court will treble the jury's estimate of damages.62 
But this refusal to inform the jury of trebling will do no more 
than help reduce some types of jury manipulation. A voiding any 
discussion of treble damages prevents a jury unaware of trebling 
from lowering its award, because the jury never perceives a windfall 
to the plaintiff. 63 To ensure accurate damage determinations, how-
ever, courts must prevent two further possiblities of manipulation. 
First, juries may impose their own punitive sanctions on defendants. 
Second, some juries may know of trebling independently of the trial, 
and decrease the award accordingly. 
The second procedure currently relied on to discourage manipu-
lation, i.e., cautionary instructions, may somewhat, but not com-
pletely, alleviate these concerns. Courts typically instruct juries to 
treat corporate litigants fairly.64 These instructions, however, have 
not quelled the widely acknowledged bias against corporate defend-
ants, and to the extent these instructions alert the jury to the corpo-
rate "deep pocket," they aggravate rather than mitigate the 
problem. 65 The judge also typically instructs the jury to award only 
compensatory damages, to "put the plaintiff in as good a position as 
if the . . . violation had not occurred."66 But judges give such in-
62. Even the courts which have approved of instructing the jury on trebling have not held 
it error to do otherwise. Thus, district courts in circuits where the older opinions prevail 
should exercise their discretion and follow the contemporary approach of not infonmng the 
jury of trebling, and of conducting antitrust trials so as to avoid references to treble damages. 
63. The present assumption that juries are unaware of trebling seems plausible. All courts 
deciding the issue in the past eight years have come to this conclusion. See note 18 supra. 
Perhaps most persuasive, plaintiffs apparently believe juries do not know of trebling. If plain-
tiffs thought juries did know of trebling, they would desire an instruction explaining the pur-
poses of trebling to offset the perception of a windfall. 
64. See note 29 supra. 
65. Kalven has noted that cautionary instructions can sensitize a jury to an issue. Using 
mock juries, he found that instructing the jury to disregard insurance actually raised awards. 
Personal Injury Damage Award, supra note 2, at 163; Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of 
the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368, 377-78 (1957). Similarly, an 
instruction to treat a corporation fairly might emphasize the "deep pocket" of the corporate 
defendant. See generally note 27 supra. 
66. See, e.g, cases cited in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 18, at 170-72. A typi-
cal instruction where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy is: "The purpose of awarding damages 
in a private antitrust case is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as if the conspiracy had 
not occurred." Reno-West Coast Distrib. Co. v. The Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1979). 
The cautionary instruction given at trial in MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-
2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file), admonished 
only that "Any damages you do award must have a reasonable basis in the evidence and 
cannot be based upon speculation, guess or conjecture." Appendix, jury instruction 54. 
Whether the jury increased the damage award in the case because of perceived inequity, and 
whether an instruction reserving questions o( equity to the court would have countered this 
tendency, are of course unanswerable questions. What is clear is that the jury arrived at a 
reversibly excessive damage award despite a conventional cautionary instruction. 
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structions in most civil cases, and juries nevertheless manipulate 
damage awards. 67 Given that these instructions have not succeeded 
in eliminating jury manipulation in other civil cases, it seems doubt-
ful that they can do so in the special context of antitrust suits. Conse-
quently, the courts should consider additional measures to 
encourage accurate damage assessments in treble damage actions. 
B. New Procedures for Reducing Jury Manipulation 
The courts might take advantage of several possibilities for fur-
ther curtailing jury manipulation of damages in antitrust cases. 
Some of the options, both traditional68 and radical, 69 reject the very 
idea of jury determination of damages. The seventh amendment 
poses a serious obstacle to such approaches. Moreover, properly 
guided, the jury performs a valuable function in estimating real but 
uncertain damages.7° Consequently, this Note proposes two re-
61. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text. 
68. The most direct response to perceived jury manipulation is the remittitur, by which the 
trial judge orders a new trial unless the plaintiff consents to a lower damage award set by the 
judge. The device, however, is of limited utility in the antitrust context. The determination of 
antitrust damages is often highly uncertain. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. This 
uncertainty restricts the use of the remittitur in two ways. First, as a threshold matter, most 
courts require that the damages be clearly excessive as a matter of law. See, e.g., Brents v. 
Freeman's Oil Field Serv., Inc., 448 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971); Collum v. Butler, 288 F. Supp. 
918 (N.D. ill. 1968), qffd, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970). Quite aside from any policy prefer-
ence for jury determinations in cases of uncertainty, a clear showing of excessive damages may 
be impossible. Second, even where a remittitur is ordered, the judge may still set the damages 
at the highest level not clearly erroneous; while there is some dissent as to where the court has 
the authority to fix the remittitur amount, "[t]his is the only theory that has any reasonable 
claim of being consistent with the Seventh Amendment." 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2815 at 104-05 (1973). Setting damages at the highest level 
permitted by uncertain evidence, to be trebled subsequently, does little to reduce the problem. 
An additional problem is that plaintiffs may elect a new trial (particularly if limited to dam-
ages only), resulting in a certain waste of judicial resources and a repeated risk of jury manipu-
lation in the second trial. And where knowledge of trebling leads to a reduced award, no 
direct tampering with the verdict is possible, because the federal courts do not permit the 
practice of additur. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935). 
69. The issue of whether the risks of jury decisions in complex cases so jeopardize the due 
process interests of defendants as to override the seventh amendment's guarantee of the right 
to jury trial in civil cases is beyond the scope of this Note. Compare In re United States Fin. 
Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom, Grant v. Union Bank, 446 
U.S. 929 (1980), w1~h In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d 
Cir. 1980). For an analysis of the uncertainties involved in this isssue,see Lempert, Civil Juries 
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981). For a summary 
of the literature on the subject, see id at 69 n.3. For the purposes of this Note, it suffices to 
observe that abolishing jury trials for civil antitrust cases remains an approach fraught with 
constitutional doubts, particularly where the jury manipulation complained of involves pre-
cisely the sort of jury value judgments which inspired the seventh amendment, rather than any 
inability to comprehend the technical issues admittedly presented in many antitrust cases. 
70. This, of course, is one of the reasons for relying on juries in the first place. Judge 
Wright, in defending the strict standard of review applied to trial court decisions to uphold 
jury awards, voiced the received wisdom by acknowledging "the deference properly given to 
the jury's determination of such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum 
of damages," a deference "further weighted by the constitutional allocation to the jury of ques-
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forms intended to minimize manipulation without disturbing the im-
portant role of the jury in deciding civil lawsuits. 
I. Proposed Jury Instruction 
Many courts already give juries instructions intended to discour-
age jury manipulation. Courts often instruct juries to treat corporate 
defendants fairly71 and, in treble damage actions, to award only 
compensatory damages.72 Both types of instructions are given as ad-
monitions: the jury is told what or what not to do. 
Such instructions do have some influence. Since jurors perceive 
judges as authority figures, they feel some pressure to follow the 
judges' instruction.73 Clearly, however, these instructions are not to-
tally effective at controlling juries: manipulation continues despite 
such instruction.74 Furthermore, because the instructions concerning 
corporate defendants may sensitize a jury to the corporate "deep 
pocket," such instructions may prove counterproductive.75 
A growing number of researchers have adopted a sociological 
theory that helps explain jury manipulation and the limitations of 
admonishing instructions.76 This theory, termed "equity theory,"77 
tions of fact." Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 835 (1969). 
71. See note 29 supra. 
72. See note 83 infra. 
73. Juries are influenced by the judge. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 426-
27 (in criminal cases where the evidence clearly favors one side, judges virtually eliminate jury 
manipulation if they exercise the power to comment on the evidence). The judge, as an 
authority figure, might be successful in persuading jurors to ignore their evaluations of equity 
in favor of the law. See Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1049-50 
(1974). 
Subjects in social psychology experiments have been willing to trust the value judgments 
and perceptions of authority figures. Milgram, in one famous experiment, persuaded his sub-
jects to continue administering increasingly large electric shocks even after the ''victims" of the 
shocks cried out in pain. 62% of the subjects continued to administer the shocks when in-
structed to do so. The "victims" were accomplices of Milgram in the experiment. See Mil-
gram, Some Conditions of Obedience and .Disobedience lo Authority, 18 HUMAN REL, 57 (1965). 
The legal analogy to this obedience is that the jury does not often openly disobey the judge. 
See note 85 infra and accompanying text. 
74. Despite the fact that juries are typically instructed on awarding actual damages, ma-
nipulation is common. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text. The limitations of such 
instructions are clearly recognized by judges who refuse to inform juries of trebling, since such 
judges implicitly reject the alternative of providing such information and instructing the jury 
to provide full compensatory damages. See generally note 18 supra. 
75. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
16. See E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER & E. BERSCHIED, EQUITY 64-81 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as EQUITY]; lzzet & Sales, supra note 16. Izzet and Sales have concluded that equity 
theory is more consistent with the data on jury behavior than other proposed explanations of 
jury behavior. 
77. Homans first developed this theory as a "rule of distributive justice." G. HOMANS, 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 74-75 (1961). He advanced equity theory as the grand design overarching 
the discrete theories of sociology. See id. at 10-12. Waister, Waister and Berschied also ad-
vance equity theory as the all-encompassing construct of sociology. See EQUITY, supra note 
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posits that people consider a relationship equitable when both par-
ties to the relationship receive outcomes proportionate to their in-
vestments. 78 A participant in an inequitable relationship will feel 
distressed79 and will have a psychological need to correct the ineq-
uity.80 Researchers have found that observers of an inequitable rela-
tionship react similarly to participants81 and consequently will 
attempt to remedy the inequity. Jurors are observers of the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and defendant, and like other observers, 
feel a real psychological need to restore equity to inequitable situa-
tions. 82 If a jury thinks legal remedies alone, such as compensatory 
damages, will fail to rectify any inequities, the jury will strive to rem-
edy the situation through its decision on liability and damages. 83 
The cautionary instructions, though somewhat effective because 
of the judge's authority, do not satisfy this psychological need. The 
76, at 1-2. For the purposes of this Note, equity theory is only used to explain the behavior of 
juries, not the entire sociological universe. 
Adams is the other early developer of equity theory. In Adams, Inequity in Social Ex-· 
change, in 2 ADVANCES lN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965), 
he presented a more sophisticated version of the theory, emphasizing the reactions of people to 
"inequitable relationships." 
Both Homans and Adams used equity theory to explain industrial relations problems. Be-
cause of the abundance of empirical and experimental research in this area, the field has be-
come a prime testing ground for equity theorists. See EQUITY, supra note 76, at 114-41 (review 
of research in this area, indicating the consistency of equity theory with actual behavior). 
18. See Izzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 211-13; Waister, Berschied, & Waister, New .Direc-
tions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 151, 151-53 (1973). 
More rigorously, equity theory explains how observers to a relationship react to that rela-
tionship. The theory presumes that people wish to maximize the outcome from any given 
relationship. It does not presume that people are altruistic. The outcome of a relationship 
consists of the ratio of rewards to costs (rewards being those satisfying results such as health, 
happiness, increased wages or an interesting job; costs, such as losing a job, are the frustrating 
obstacles to psychological and emotional satisfaction). Individuals maximize their outcomes, 
however, within an accepted set of societal norms which allocate rewards and costs. See Izzet 
& Sales, supra note 16, at 212-13; Waister, Berschied & Waister, supra at 151-53. 
An equitable relationship can be expressed by the equation: 
R1 =R2 
C1 =C2 
where R1 and R2 signify the rewards of the two people, and C1 and C2 signify the costs. 
Each reward and cost can be broken down into inputs and outputs, but this level of sophistica-
tion is not required here. See Izzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 212. 
79. The Walsters and Berschied call the research evidence of this distress "compelling." 
EQUITY, supra note 76, at 17. What is particularly convincing is that even the beneficiaries of 
an inequitable relationship, the "exploiters" of the relationship, feel "distressed" by the ineq-
uity. Id. at 17-18, 22-44. 
80. EQUITY, supra note 76, at 18. 
81. lzzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 214. See Baker, Experimental Analysis of Third Party 
Behavior, 30 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 307, 315 (1974). 
82. Izzet and Sales note the similarity in how observers are used in psychological personal 
perception studies, and the manner in which jurors are used to evaluate the litigants. Both the 
observers and jurors are neutral third parties who react to the inequities in the relationship 
before them. lzzet & Sales, supra note 18, at 214-15. 
83. When a jury manipulates its damage award to reflect the equities, it is reallocating the 
costs and rewards of the relationship in an attempt to restore equity. See id. at 215. 
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instructions create a tension between the desire to obey the judge 
and the need to restore equity to inequitable situations. 84 While a 
jury might not consciously disregard the judge, Kalven and Zeisel's 
research indicates that when cases are close and evidence is indeci-
sive, the jury "yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolv-
ing doubts as to evidence."85 
To reduce the likelihood of jury manipulation, an instruction 
must recognize and address the jury's need to restore equity.86 The 
instruction proposed here is intended to convince the jury that the 
judge will remedy any perceived inequities. Under the proposed in-
struction, the judge does not say that factors such as intent, culpabil-
ity and motive are irrelevant; he instead reserves these questions for 
himself. Specifically, courts should instruct the jury: 
If you find for the plaintiff in accordance with these instructions, it 
then becomes your responsibility to determine the actual economic 
damages which the plaintiff has suffered. You are only to concern 
yourself with determing actual damages. 
I realize that over the course of the trial you may have developed 
strong personal feelings about the parties or their conduct. The jury, 
however, is a fact-finder. You should reach your decision on the facts 
and not on the basis of your emotions. Questions of fairness and pun-
ishment are for the court and the court has and will take these into 
account in renderingjudgment.87 
This instruction minimizes the jury's psychological need to manipu-
late the damage award by advising the jury that its equitable con-
cerns will be addressed. Instead of creating tensions between the 
tendency to obey the judge and the need to restore equity, the in-
84. The tendency to follow the judge, see note 73 supra and accompanying text, can be 
included in the equity equation. Because of the strong moral pressure to obey the judge, em-
phasized by the decorum and solemnity of the courtroom, there is a psychological cost to the 
jurors in restoring equity in disobedience of instructions. 
85. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note I, at 165 (criminal cases). See Personal Injury 
.Damage Award, supra note 2, at 172 (civil cases) ("[T]he jury's special equities are likely to 
come into play only where there is a gap or ambiguity in the facts, where that is the contro-
versy ~ic] is close to indeterminate. Then the jury may utilize the freedom created by the 
doubt to add some equities the law ignores."). 
86. Because of the subtle influence of bias, more strident admonishing instructions would 
probably not eliminate jury manipulation. In close cases, the jury could still impose its value 
judgments with the belief that it was resolving difficult issues of facL 
87. It might seem somewhat deceptive to tell the jury that adjustments of the award are 
"questions for the court" when in fact trebling is mandatory. One court, however, approved a 
similiarly deceptive instruction precisely because it hides the mandatory nature of the adjust• 
ment. Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220, 223-24 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 
414 U.S. 829 (1973). This deceptive language seems desirable for the same reason that juries 
are not informed of trebling; if the jury knows the court has to make some adjustments, it may 
not believe the final result will be equitable and hence may manipulate its award. 
This instruction avoids another potential problem. Juries are given wide latitude in deter• 
mining damages in antitrust suits. See note 6 supra. An overemphasis on actual damages in 
the instructions might tend to cut back on this latitude. This proposed instruction, however, 
only restricts the jury's latitude in assessing awards based on noneconomic considerations. It 
does not restrict the jury's freedom in computing awards on the basis of economic loss. 
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struction should assure jurors that obeying instructions will result in 
a fair and equitable conclusion. The jury will then be more likely to 
restrict itself to determining the actual losses suffered by the 
plaintiff. 88 
2. Special Procedures for Verdicts 
Courts can complement the use of this cautionary instruction by 
using special verdicts and general verdicts accompanied by interrog-
atories. 89 When the court adopts a special verdict, the judge asks the 
jury to answer written questions upon each issue of fact, and the 
court then reaches a verdict by applying the law to the jury's factual 
fi.ndings.90 A general verdict accompanied by interrogatories also re-
quires the jury to answer written questions submitted by the judge 
on specific factual issues. Under this procedure the jury still returns 
a normal liability and damage verdict.91 
These procedures offer useful tools for minimizing jury manipu-
lation, because they encourage the jury to focus on the specific issues 
88. The instruction will probably have less effect on the problem of a jury reducing its 
award than on a jury increasing its award. A jury aware of trebling must infer that "questions 
of fairness" includes adjustments to offset the plaintiffs windfall. If the jury does not infer this, 
it may lower its award to offset the perceived windfall to the plaintiff. In contrast, a jury 
unaware of trebling is explicitly told not to impose its value judgments. In this situation, the 
instruction does not rely on an inference. 
89. Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to use either of these 
procedures at its own discretion. FED. R. C1v. P. 49. See generally 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 95-97 
(1968-69) (proceedings of the National Institute on Preparation and Trial of Antitrust Treble 
Damage Suits, American Bar Assn., Nov. 7-8, 1968) (discussing the use of rule 49 procedures 
from the tactical perspectives of antitrust litigants). 
The MCI court also suggested use of a special master on remand to assist in the determina-
tion of damages. See MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 
1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file) n.122. This suggestion is of limited 
utility in controlling jury manipulation. First, rule 53(b) provides that "reference to a master 
shall be the exception and not the rule." Second, in a jury trial, the master's report is not even 
a discretionary guide to the fact-finder, as it would be in a bench trial; instead, the report is 
read to the jury as evidence, and subject to attack by the parties. While the report may serve 
the important functions of providing the jury with a reasonable standard to fall back on, and 
of informing appellate review of the damage determination, so long as the jury is inclined to 
manipulate damages a third estimate added to that of the plaintiff and the defendant may have 
limited impact. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53. 
90. Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts, 2 F.R.D. 138, 139 (1941). The court gives the jury 
such instructions and explanations as are necessary to answer the questions. FED. R. C1v. P. 
49(a). Cautionary instructions, such as the one proposed in this Note, would accompany a 
special verdict charge. 
There is a split in the federal courts on whether to inform the jury of the legal effect of its 
answers. Compare Gullett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d llOO (7th Cir. 1971), 
with Lowery v. Clause, 348 F.2d 252, 261 (8th Cir. 1965). Presumably courts using special 
verdicts in antitrust cases would not inform the jury of the treble damage provision. Since 
jurors are not told the legal effect of the damage determination when a general verdict is used, 
see note 18 supra and accompanying text, courts should not inform them of the legal effect of 
the special verdict questions on damages. 
91. Rule 49 provides for special procedures if the answers to the interrogatories are incon-
sistent with the general verdict, inconsistent with other answers, or both. FED. R. C1v. P. 49(b). 
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involved in a case.92 By requiring the jury to reach a factual deter-
mination on each theory of damages advanced by the plaintiff, the 
court forces the jury to concentrate on these theories instead of sim-
ply providing a lump sum damages figure.93 Additionally, these pro-
cedures simplify the jury's task by identifying specific questions, 
instead of leaving the jury broad discretion to unsort a large aggre-
gate of complex facts.94 
Appellate courts have already suggested that trial judges make 
more use of these devices in complex antitrust cases. In addition to 
reducing the likelihood of jury manipulation, the use of these proce-
dures facilitates appellate review of jury decisions.95 Because the 
92. See Lowrey v. Clause, 348 F.2d 252, 260 (8th Cir. 1965); Moore-McCormack Lines, 
Inc. v. Maryland Ship Ceiling Co., 311 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1962); 9 C. WRIGHT & A, 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2511 (1971); Nordbye, supra note 90, at 139. 
But see Personal Injury IJamage Award, supra note 2, at 162. 
93. Kalven noted that juries tend to think of recoveries as single sums, rather than analyz-
ing each recovery as a sum of component damage awards. He felt a more effective instruction 
could make the jury conscious of its duty to compute the component sums. See Personal I,y'ury 
IJamage Award, supra note 2, at 161. Even when judges have used special verdicts in verdicts 
in antitrust cases, they have used open-ended questions on damages. After asking detailed 
questions to establish an antitrust violation, courts typically ask for a lump sum damage figure 
for each violation. See, e.g., E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 18, § 90.43; SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 18, at 193-204. 
Such a "lump sum" technique may be an important cause of jury manipulation. Since this 
technique does not require the jury to consider each theory of damages carefully, the jury can 
award what it deems a reasonable amount without limiting itself to the amount suggested by 
the merits of each separate theory. As this approach allows a significant amount of discretion, 
the jury may not feel that it is disregarding the judge's instruction if it arrives at an equitable 
result 
Special verdicts can be used to help control damage awards by forcing the jury to specifi-
cally decide the merits of each theory of damages advanced by the plaintiff. See Nordbye, 
Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rev. 672, 687 
(1952) (noting that through the use of interrogatories accompanying a general verdict, courts 
can direct the attention of juries to the important issues: "[t)oo often juries generalize in their 
determinations . . . without deliberating upon the crucial questions which are conditions pre-
cedent to the general verdict"). 
94. Sunderland, Verdicts Special and General, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 259 (1919-20). To the 
extent that this helps clarify the factual issues, and ease their resolution, it should reduce jury 
manipulation. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
95. See MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (avail-
able on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The special verdict employed in that case de-
tailed the theories of liability quite extensively, but reduced the issue of damages to a single 
lump-sum question. Appendix, special verdict questions 1,7. Since the lost-profit study plain-
tiff offer to prove damages did not, and probably could not, separately account for the effect of 
each claim of liability, the Court of Appeals could only remand for another determination of 
damages. This illustrates both that special verdicts facilitate appellate review (for without the 
special verdict on liability the appellate court could never have scrutinized the link between 
the liability claims actually upheld by the jury and the damage award), and that special ver-
dicts should be designed to encourage the more specific connection of damages with theories of 
liability. MCI may present a case where the only available measure of damages, plaintiffs 
study, measures only the cumulative impact of all liability claims - some of which were dis-
missed before trial. In such cases the trial will be dispositive only when defendant prevails on 
all liability issues, unless the jury adjusts the damage estimate to account for liability claims 
thrown out before trial or by the jury itself, in such a way as to survive appellate review. This 
sort of adjustment may prove impossible, but is surely more likely if special verdicts relate 
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procedures identify the theories of liability and damages that the 
Jury relied on, appellate courts need not speculate on these matters in 
determining whether the evidence supported the verdict. Addition-
ally, if an appellate court reverses the jury on an issue, only that 
specific issue need be retried, not the entire case.96 These advan-
tages, together with the potential for minimizing jury manipulation, 
strongly recommend the use of the rule 49 procedures.97 
CONCLUSION 
Kalven and Zeisel, in their epic work on the jury system, con-
clude that the jury embodies "a daring effort in human arrangements 
to work out a solution to the tensions between law and equity and 
anarchy."98 Without challenging the wisdom of this effort, it is clear 
that jury behavior can often impede the just enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. This Note offers a modest solution to this problem. But 
this restraint should not obscure the genuine need for additional gui-
dance to the jury in assessing antitrust damages, even as it under-
scores the absence of serious disadvantages to the proposed 
procedures. By following the approach advocated here, courts will 
better harmonize the use of the jury as a fact-finder and the policies 
advanced by private antitrust suits. 
liability claims directly to damage estimates. Such procedures also encourage plaintiffs to de-
vise damage estimates which can be adjusted for adverse judgments on some liability claims, 
potentially avoiding retrials in situations like MCI. 
Appellate courts have suggested that trial judges make more use of these devices in com-
plex antitrust cases. See SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 80-1484, slip op. at 19 n.14 (8th 
Cir. Oct. 2, 1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,279 (2d Cir. 1979). 
96. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979). 
97. In spite of these advantages, commentators have noted that these procedures are rarely 
used. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 92, § 2505. One reason is that trial judges 
are often pressed for time and these procedures require extra work. See Gunn, The Jury Sys-
tem and Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 175, 178 (1970). To ease the workload, the judge 
could ask counsel to submit proposed jury instructions. Indeed the courts should do every-
thing possible to ensure accurate verdicts in large, complex cases. Precisely because these cases 
involve so huge a commitment of judicial resources, the costs of error increase accordingly. It 
has also been suggested that these procedures impermissibly intrude upon a jury's freedom. 
Justices Black and Douglas in fact considered the devices an unconstitutional impairment of 
the right to a jury trial. See 374 U.S. 861, 867-68 (1963) (dissenting from the amendments to 
Rule 49). In the context of treble damage actions, this argument is unpersuasive, since jury 
freedom can undercut the important policies served by such actions, and can lead to results 
which the jury itself would consider inequitable. 
98. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 499. 
